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Abstract: The Common Core State Standards Initiative seeks to prepare all students to 
graduate high school without remedial needs, to improve transparency across states’ 
accountability systems, and to foster efficiencies in the development and distribution of 
educational resources. The reform was adopted in more than 40 states and has been 
described as state-led. We examined federal and philanthropic funding for the reform 
through a conceptual lens of resource dependence theory. Our document analyses surfaced 
eight pathways along which funding for the Common Core traveled into, through, and 
around the public education system. We consider clusters of pathways according to their 
purposes and the consequences of such clustering for the reform. We conclude by 
discussing benefits derived from this funding for different types of entities that grant and 
receive it. 
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¿Dinero inteligente? Financiamiento federal y filantrópico para el Common Core 
Resumen: El Common Core intenta a preparar cada estudiante para que se gradúen sin 
necesidad de clases remediales; para mejorar la transparencia a de los sistemas de 
responsabilidad través de estados; y para promover la eficaz en el desarrollo y distribuc ión de 
recursos educativos. Se ha adoptada esta reforma en más de 40 estados y se ha descrito como 
dirigida por el estado. Los investigadores examinaron el financiamiento federal y filantrópico 
para la reforma por medio de un prisma conceptual basado en la teoría de dependencia de 
recursos. Este documento analiza ocho vías a través de las cuales el Common Core se transportó 
en, por y alrededor del sistema público de educación. Los investigadores consideran racimos de 
vías de acuerdo con sus propósitos y consecuencias para la reforma. Se concluye con una 
discusión de los beneficios derivados de este financiamiento para diferentes tipos de entidades 
que lo otorgan y lo reciben. 
Palabras-clave: Política educativa; reforma educativa; filantropía educativa; Common Core 
 
Dinheiro esperto? O finacimento federal e filantrópico para o Common Core 
Resumo: O Common Core tenta preparar todos os estudantes para se formar, para melhorar a 
transparência dos sistemas de responsabilidade entre os estados, e promover o desenvolvimento 
efetivo e distribuição de recursos educacionais. Esta reforma foi aprovada em mais de 40 
estados e tem sido descrito como dirigido pelo estado. Os pesquisadores examinaram o 
financiamento federal e filantrópico para o reforma através de um prisma conceitual baseado na 
teoria de dependência de recursos. Este artigo analisa oito maneiras em que o Common Core foi 
transportado em e ao redor do sistema de educação pública. Os investigadores consideram 
maneiras aglomerados de acordo com os seus fins e as implicações para a reforma. Conclui-se 
com uma discussão sobre os benefícios deste financiamento para diferentes tipos de entidades 
que dá-lo e recebê-lo. 
Palavras-chave: Política educativa; reforma educativa; filantropia educativa; Common Core 
 
Introduction 
 
The Common Core State Standards Initiative (“Common Core”) is a standards-based reform 
introduced to the public in June 2009. Its mathematics and English language arts standards, released 
in June 2010, have been adopted by more than 40 states and the District of Columbia. A diverse set 
of policy, education, business, civic, and military organizations regard the Common Core’s “fewer, 
clearer, higher standards” as necessary, if not sufficient, to meet the reform’s central goal: enabling 
all students to graduate “college and career ready” and to compete in a global economy (Common 
Core State Standards Initiative, Statements of Support, n.d.).  
The Common Core’s proponents launched the reform in a policy window created by 
Congress’ lengthy inability to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). 
This left in place the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), under which states established 
their own, often-inadequate, academic standards, tests, and performance standards (or cut scores) 
(Hamilton, Stecher, & Yuan, 2008; Stecher, Vernez, & Steinberg, 2010). The Common Core’s 
advocates asserted NCLB should be superseded by a system of common standards, assessments, 
and performance standards. Doing so would increase transparency across states’ accountability 
systems. It would also foster economies of scale in testing, professional development, instructional 
materials, and other resources required for implementing the standards in disparate schools 
(Rothman, 2011).  
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Whether the Common Core could spur universal college and career preparation, 
transparency, and economies of scale was uncertain given the performance of prior standards-based 
reforms (Cohen & Moffitt, 2009; Hamilton, Stecher, & Yuan, 2008; Loveless, 2012). What was clear 
was that substantial sums would be spent on developing, advocating for, and implementing the new 
reform. In July 2009, the U.S. Department of Education incentivized the reform’s adoption through 
its $4.35 billion Race to the Top Competition, which weighed states’ grant applications against 
criteria including common standards and common assessments. Several prominent philanthropic 
foundations, particularly the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, explicitly backed the reform 
(Dillon, 2009; Rothman, 2011).  
Our research examined how money has been used by philanthropic foundations and the 
federal government to advance the Common Core. What types of organizations or entities (e.g., 
school districts, curriculum developers, test developers) have received funding? What consequences 
for the reform itself might follow from this funding? What benefits have been derived for 
organizations that grant and receive funding?  
The article is organized into six parts: First, we provide background to situate the study 
within the contexts of standards-based reform and education reform funding. Second, we present 
the study’s conceptual framework, resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Third, we 
describe our methods, data, and data analyses. Fourth, we present our findings, which identify four 
philanthropic and four federal pathways of funding, the pathways’ purposes, and the types of 
organizations that have been funded. Fifth, in the discussion, we cluster pathways according to their 
purposes and explore consequences of this clustering for the reform. Finally, we consider the 
benefits derived from this funding for the different types of entities that grant and receive it.  
 
Background 
Standards-Based Reforms 
 The Common Core State Standards Initiative is a standards-based reform (SBR) intended to 
provide the U.S. education system with a set of rigorous national standards (Rothman, 2011). 
Standards-based reforms seek to increase achievement and equity by aligning academic content 
standards with curriculum, instruction, assessment, and other resources (O’Day & Smith, 1993; 
Smith & O’Day, 1991). Assessment results are supposed to provide feedback to improve teaching 
and learning and are typically used for accountability purposes (Linn, 2000), whose political salience 
has grown over time (Elmore, Abelmann, & Fuhrman, 1996; Mehta, 2013). 
Variants of SBR have been employed by individual states since the early 1980s. The ongoing 
use of SBR as a policy tool is understandable. SBR exerts powerful influences throughout the U.S. 
education system (Hamilton, Stecher, & Yuan, 2008; Natriello & Pallas, 2001), whose loosely 
coupled structure typically renders it slow and difficult to change (Tyack & Cuban, 1995; Weick, 
1978).   
Federal efforts to promote national education goals and standards emerged during the 
presidential administrations of G.H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. These were stymied by disputes over 
whether to pair standards and goals for academic achievement (or outputs) with “opportunity-to-
learn-” (or input) standards and by concerns about federal overreach (Vinovskis, 2009). Federally 
required SBR gained traction under NCLB (Cohen & Moffitt, 2009; Hamilton, Stecher, & Yuan, 
2008; Mehta, 2013). NCLB mandated that each state develop its own academic standards and tests, 
and use test scores in an accountability system that assigned specific, stepwise consequences to 
schools and districts. 
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While some studies of SBRs have been supportive (e.g., Carnoy & Loeb, 2002; see Hamilton, 
Stecher, & Yuan, 2008), many others find SBR generates distortions in teaching, learning, and 
accountability (e.g., Beardsley, Berliner, & Rideau, 2010; Booher-Jennings, 2005; Davidson, Reback, 
Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2013; Koretz, 2008; McNeil, Coppola, Radigan, & Vasquez-Heilig, 2008; Neal 
& Schanzenbach, 2007). Policymakers’ arguments that such reforms will improve achievement and 
reduce inequities are not well supported by research. In the decade after NCLB’s 2002 enactment, 
fourth and eighth graders’ NAEP scores showed some improvements, but these are hard to attribute 
to SBR (Hamilton, Stecher, & Yuan, 2008). From 2013 to 2015, most NAEP scores for fourth and 
eighth graders declined. On NAEP’s long-term trend assessments, 17-year-olds’ average 
achievement and achievement gaps between racial and ethnic groups remained largely unchanged in 
the decade after NCLB (U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
2012). U.S. students’ scores on PISA – which assess 15-year-olds’ performance in math, science, and 
reading – are unchanged since 2000, but their rankings have dropped relative to other nations 
(Heitin, 2013; Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, n.d.).  
The Common Core’s advocates asserted the new reform would increase achievement and 
reduce achievement gaps, because it was designed to correct for its predecessors’ flaws (Kornhaber, 
Griffith, & Tyler, 2014; Loveless, 2016; Rothman, 2011). Specifically, the Common Core was 
intended to replace states’ variable, and often low, academic standards. It was also intended to 
enable comparisons in the performance of students, schools, and districts across states through the 
use of standards-aligned tests. The tests were to be developed by two assessment consortia, the 
Partnership for the Advancement of Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC) and Smarter 
Balanced and administered on digital devices. This would give educators quicker access to feedback 
they could use to improve instruction (Baron & Linn, 2013). 
 Per McDonnell and Weatherford (2013), the Common Core’s proponents gleaned from 
past efforts at nation-wide SBR both policy lessons, which informed how they designed the reform, 
and political lessons, which informed how they advocated for it. As a result, the Common Core’s 
proponents “engaged allies from across the political spectrum and from a wide range of educational 
policy interests” (McDonnell & Weatherford, 2013, p. 489). Both the Common Core’s design and 
advocacy required funding. 
 
Education Reform Funding from Philanthropies and the Federal Government 
 
Private philanthropic foundations and the federal government each contribute a small 
percentage of all dollars spent annually on K-12 public education. Nevertheless, as we describe in 
this section, they have used this funding to exercise considerable influence over public education 
policy, particularly after the enactment of NCLB (Greene, 2015; Reckhow, 2015). We also note how 
private foundations and the federal government have coordinated their efforts to advance the 
Common Core.   
 
Philanthropic dollars. There is neither a single scholarly definition of philanthropy nor a 
clearly defined set of motives or methods of giving that distinguish between what is or isn’t 
philanthropy. Definitions have changed over time, and different scholars have defined philanthropy 
in terms of how it has been practiced (Sulek, 2010). For this article, we view philanthropy in terms 
of the practice of giving money to any entity (e.g., public, private, for-profit, nonprofit) by private, 
IRS-designated charitable organizations to foster change in public education through the adoption 
of the Common Core. In this article, these organizations are called philanthropies or private 
foundations. 
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Philanthropic giving to education, some $1.82 billion in 2011, has risen markedly since 2000, 
but it still accounts for less than one-half of one percent of all K-12 funding (Foundation Center, 
Foundation Stats, n.d.; Greene, 2015; Reckhow, 2015). Public education may be more tractable to 
private foundations’ policy directions when, as now, policymakers increasingly see private sector 
solutions as normative (Mehta, 2013), and the public increasingly sees government as a problem 
(Pew Research Center, 2013). Moreover, philanthropies’ strategically used sums may be especially 
powerful during economic recessions, the context in which the Common Core was unveiled in 2009.  
Although private foundations’ efforts to reform education are not new (Cuban, 2015; 
Colvin, 2005; Lagemann, 1992; Zunz, 2012), in recent decades, prominent philanthropies across the 
social and political spectrum have been more active in advancing policy agendas (Confessore, 2011; 
Greene, 2005, 2015; Ravitch, 2013; Reckhow, 2013, 2015; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014). Private 
foundations’ wealth enables them to influence public policy through strategic, leveraged giving 
rather than through electoral politics and democratic participation (Cuban, 2015; Mehta & Teles, 
2011; Schmitt, 2015). Moreover, since the early 2000s, these foundations have increasingly 
coordinated their giving to extend their leverage over particular policies, including market-based 
reforms, SBRs such as the Common Core, and accountability schemes that rely on test scores 
(Reckhow, 2015; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014).  
Private foundations have gained greater influence in public policy partly through 
“jurisdictional challengers” (Reckhow & Snyder, 2014, p. 186). These are unelected political actors 
from the philanthropic world, or well supported by it, who form alliances with government at the 
state or federal level (Mehta & Teles, 2011; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014). An example of jurisdictional 
challengers is the appointment of staffers from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to top federal 
policy positions under Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (Brill, 2011; Dillon, 2009; Mehta & 
Teles, 2011). This alliance between philanthropic and government sectors was furthered by waivers 
from ethics rules issued by the Obama administration to allow the new federal appointees to 
continue conferring with their former employer, the Gates Foundation (Dillon, 2009).  
Cuban (2015) maintains that efforts to move education policy away from local authorities 
and consolidate it at state and federal levels did not begin with private foundations’ recent endeavors 
but rather with the federal government’s 1965 ESEA legislation. However, the “muscular 
philanthropy” these foundations are now exercising has increased such policy consolidation (Cuban, 
2015, p. 5). Therefore, private foundations’ growing influence on public education clearly merits 
attention by policy researchers. Yet, researchers’ need for grants has a chilling effect on such 
scholarship (Colvin, 2005; Hess, 2005). Moreover, because philanthropies are not required to 
disclose the purpose of their giving – only amounts and recipients – it can be difficult to know how 
philanthropic dollars are being used (Greene, 2005; Hess, 2005; Reckhow, 2013). Nevertheless, 
exploring philanthropic funding of public education can surface the types of entities that have been 
funded and whether funding is concentrated or disbursed across different entities. This information 
alongside other documentation can enable insights into the purposes of philanthropic giving and, in 
turn, further public understanding of how education reforms may be launched with little public 
input. 
 
Federal funding. At the time the Common Core was being advanced, federal dollars 
accounted for 12.3% of all public elementary and secondary education revenues (Cornman, Keaton, 
& Glander, 2013). However, for decades before the new reform, the federal government has 
exercised outsized influence on K-12 education by using funding as policy inducements that act like 
mandates. For example, under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, schools and universities 
could be eligible for federal funding only if they rejected discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
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or national origin. Federal funding, unlike private foundations’, thus gains additional leverage from 
the government’s power to enforce compliance with the mandates that accompany federal dollars. 
Federal funding in the form of inducement-cum-mandates has been used extensively to 
promote states’ adoption of standards-based reform. Notably, No Child Left Behind made federal 
funding contingent on states’ adoption of standards, annual psychometric testing of student 
achievement, public reporting of disaggregated test results, and the use of scores to assign specific 
consequences to schools and districts (No Child Left Behind [NCLB], 2002). The federal 
government also used this funding approach in its Race to the Top Competition (RTTT). Of the 
$4.35 billion allocated by the federal government for RTTT, states could submit applications to 
compete for $4 billion. States’ applications were scored against criteria that encompassed SBR, and 
that embraced the Common Core in particular. Points were given to applications that incorporated 
“standards and assessments that prepare students for success in college and the workplace,” 
“developing and implementing common, high-quality assessments,” and using measures of student 
growth in state accountability systems (U.S. Department of Education, 2010, Appendix B: Scoring 
Rubric ([Corrected)]), which Common Core aligned tests were intended to enable. Joanne Weiss, a 
former Gates Foundation officer then serving as Secretary Duncan’s chief of staff, said, “States that 
have created conditions for reform will have the best chance of winning grants worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars...” (Weiss, 2009). 
To complement this federal inducement, the Gates Foundation funded McKinsey & Co. and 
several other prominent, for-profit consulting firms to help states prepare their RTTT applications 
(Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2009; Dillon, 2009). To receive such funding, states had to 
commit to an eight-point checklist to demonstrate their compliance with the foundation’s 
educational priorities (Dillon, 2009; Layton, 2014). The first three checklist items specified states’ 
commitment to the Common Core (Phillips, 2009).  
Nineteen states – most of which were aided by Gates-supported consulting firms – 
ultimately won RTTT awards (U.S. Department of Education, Race to the Top Annual Performance 
Report, n.d.). However, to better their chances of winning in the RTTT competition, nearly all states 
adopted the Common Core (U.S. Department of Education, Programs, Race to the Top, n.d., States’ 
Applications, Scores and Comments for Phase 1, Phase 2, Phase 3, n.d.; Weiss, 2013).   
In a related competitive-funding endeavor, the federal government allocated $520 million to 
its Race to the Top District program (RTT-D) to incentivize school districts to implement “college 
and career ready” standards or graduation requirements (U.S. Department of Education, Programs, 
Race to the Top District [RTT-D], n.d). Hundreds of districts applied for RTT-D funds in the 2012 
and 2013 competitions. The Department of Education awarded grants to 21 districts or consortia of 
districts (U.S. Department of Education, Programs Race to the Top District [RTT-D], n.d.). The Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation also provided support to prepare RTT-D applications (Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, What We Do, n.d.). 
Nearly all the states and districts that received federal dollars through RTTT and RTT-D 
awards incurred obligations to secure Common Core-aligned curriculum, professional development, 
interim and summative assessments, computers for digitally delivered assessments, data systems, and 
other materials. To acquire these, states and districts engaged with a range of for-profit vendors and 
non-profit entities. The distribution of this federal funding to states, districts, and, in turn, to non-
profits and for-profits merits examination, particularly given the limited influence SBRs have had on 
student achievement or achievement gaps (e.g., Loveless, 2012, 2016; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2007; 
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 2012). If such policy 
funding does not enable public education to generate higher or more equitable student achievement, 
what types of entities do benefit and what benefits do they derive?  
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Conceptual Framework 
 
This study draws on resource dependence theory (RDT) for its conceptual framework. 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). RDT holds that organizations’ activities and outcomes depend on “the 
contexts in which the organization is embedded” (Pfeffer & Salancik, p. 39). Those contexts, and 
organizations’ relationships within them are both sources of uncertainty. Organizations seek to 
reduce these uncertainties by influencing both other organizations and the contexts in which they 
and other organizations are embedded. Thereby, they can conduct their activities with greater 
predictability.  
 
Organizational Interdependence 
 
Uncertainty stemming from other organizations arises because organizations cannot conduct 
their activities in isolation but are instead “interdependent” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 39). For 
example, a school district is interdependent with its school board, state education department, 
teacher organizations, and companies that provide technology and other resources. Non-profits may 
be interdependent with government tax authorities, philanthropies, client groups, and media outlets 
that bring attention to the organization’s good work.  
To reduce the uncertainties attending interdependence, organizations engage in “social 
control processes” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 40). These serve to coordinate with, influence, 
and/or modify the organizations with which they interact (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Several 
conditions make it more likely that an organization will be influenced by other organizations’ 
attempts at social control. Among these is whether the target organization gets resources from the 
influencing organization; whether the resource is critical to the target organization’s operation; 
whether the influencing organization controls the resource or access to it, and whether the target 
organization wants to survive. Under such conditions, a target organization may become “resource 
dependent” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 52). It then accords substantial importance in its decision 
making to the influencing organization.  
Furthermore, it is possible for an organization or coordinated group of organizations to 
exercise social control over an entire sector’s organizations. This opportunity for social control 
increases when that sector is “regulated by a single agency or governed by a single law” (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978, p. 51). For example, the Federal Aviation Administration can influence all airlines. 
Similarly, as the federal government’s role in public education has grown, so has its ability to 
influence public education. Notably, under NCLB, the federal government compelled all states to 
adopt standards-aligned testing and a set of escalating consequences for schools and districts.  
 
Organizational Contexts 
 
Alongside the efforts to limit uncertainty from interdependence, organizations strive to 
reduce uncertainties from their surrounding contexts. Organizations can reduce uncertainties by 
“responding to demands implied by the context,” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 107). Thus, as 
government regulation has grown, so have organizations’ efforts to create favorable contexts for 
themselves by influencing “the larger social system and its government” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 
189). When these efforts succeed, they may generate financial subsidies or market protections to 
advance the organizations’ work (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Among the means organizations use to influence government and their social context are 
accessing policymakers, lobbying, and marketing (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Access to policymakers 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 24 No. 93 8 
 
can occur when government hires from industry or vice versa. Such hiring can simultaneously 
address uncertainties arising from organizational interdependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
The formation and advance of the Common Core was facilitated by Department of 
Education hires from organizations favoring standards-based reforms and market-based approaches. 
Among these were Joanne Weiss, previously both a Gates Foundation officer and head of the New 
Schools Venture Fund, and Jon Schnur, former head of New Leaders for New Schools and a former 
presidential policy adviser. Schnur was a key architect of Race to the Top (Brill, 2010).  
Although private foundations are restricted from lobbying, they can and do use marketing 
and public relations campaigns to influence public opinion (Schmitt, 2015). For example, 
philanthropies favoring the Common Core have made grants intended to amplify support for the 
reform across a range of political and social contexts (McDonnell & Weatherford, 2013; Molnar, 
2014; Ujifusa, 2013), which we illustrate in our findings. 
Lobbying, marketing, and public relations campaigns serve organizations’ need to be 
perceived as legitimate. Such perceptions enable organizations to garner support from the external 
contexts in which they operate. Since those contexts are continually changing, organizations 
regularly strive to convince others that their work is “just and worthy” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 
195) and tethered to the surrounding contexts’ norms, values, and beliefs (Oliver, 1990; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Particularly important for legitimacy are the norms, values, and beliefs of higher-
status organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1990).  
Via efforts to manage interdependence and reduce contextual uncertainty, federal, state, and 
local agencies responsible for public education have adopted the technical-rational nostrums that 
characterize higher-status business entities and their offshoots in venture philanthropy. Salient 
among these are metrics, big data, data analytics, measurable growth, digital delivery, competition, 
and incentives (see Barone & DeBray, 2011; Cuban, 2015; Greene, 2005, 2013; Hess, 2015; Mehta, 
2013; Reckhow, 2014; Scott, 2009). For example, Race to the Top, the federal initiative that spurred 
the Common Core’s adoption across the nation, was organized as a competition, rather than as an 
effort to address inequality as was characteristic of many prior federal education initiatives (see 
Ravitch, 2013). Moreover, governors in states that submitted RTTT applications did so in part to 
advance their own administrations’ legitimacy with the electorate (Nicholson-Crotty & Staley, 2012).    
That organizations seek to influence other organizations and to shape their environments in 
their own favor, and that they may do so in ways that coordinate and concentrate their influence, are 
all to be expected. The issue then is not so much these exercises of, and responses to, influence, but 
“whose interests are being served” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 51, citing Perrow, 1972). To 
understand whose interests are being served by the Common Core – that is, what kinds of entities 
benefit – our research examined how the federal government and private foundations have used 
money to influence other organizations’ involvement in the reform and the reform’s social and 
political contexts.  
Methods 
The following research questions guided this investigation: How has money been used by 
private foundations and the federal government to advance the Common Core? What kinds of 
entities (e.g., school districts, curriculum developers, testing entities) have been funded to advance 
the reform? What consequences for the reform itself might follow from these funding allocations? 
What sorts of benefits have been derived by different kinds of entities that grant and receive 
funding?  
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To address these questions, we undertook a qualitative study that relied on documentary 
evidence. While documents may be a source of “social facts” (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004, p. 56) and 
have been used to shed light on policy intent (see Russell, Meredith, Childs, Stein, & Prine, 2015), 
they require analysis and interpretation. To build credibility in our interpretation, our methods 
entailed triangulation of documents from multiple sources (Maxwell, 2005). We relied on documents 
from both grantees and grantors, and when additional information was needed to understand a 
grant’s purpose or recipient, we drew on secondary sources such as press releases, news articles, and 
websites from recipient organizations. As described below, our research team employed discussion, 
moderation, review, and confirmation to obtain consensus in developing and applying codes 
(Saldana, 2009). Our coding was structured around grant characteristics, including grantor, grantee, 
amount, and purpose (See Greene, 2005). Our interpretation was guided by a pragmatic perspective, 
specifically that actions, such as giving and receiving funding, are intermediaries between ideas and 
changes in the environment (Dewey, 1931). Our work primarily tracks funding awards. While such 
awards may not always accord with actual expenditures reported on IRS forms (Reckhow, 2013), 
they nevertheless reflect foundations’ and the federal government’s priorities for the Common Core 
reform. In accord with resource dependence theory, such awards represent efforts to influence the 
reform’s contexts and entities within it.  
 
Data Sources  
 
We collected data for this study from five sources: (1) 309 announcements of grants awarded 
by private foundations in support of the Common Core reform between 2008 and June 15, 2014. 
These include the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the GE 
Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, the Leona M. and Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust, the 
Joyce Foundation, the Lumina Foundation, and the Noyce Foundation;1 (2) grant applications from 
the 19 states that received Race to the Top awards from the U.S. Department of Education during 
Phases 1-3 (2010-2013); (3) grant applications from the 21 school districts and district consortia that 
received federal Race to the Top District awards in its two competitions in 2012 and 2013; (4) two 
Assessment Program applications and award letters sent to the two Common Core testing consortia 
funded under the federal Race to the Top Program, and (5) 16 federal Institute for Educational 
Sciences (IES) grant award summaries for projects involving the Common Core between 2011 and 
June 15, 2014.   
Data Analysis 
Philanthropies’ publicly posted descriptions of funded projects were examined for evidence 
of support for the Common Core’s development, advocacy, or implementation. For each of the 309 
grants intended to support the Common Core, we identified the amount of the grant and the type of 
grantee, such as school district, state, non-profit entity, or for-profit organization. The latter two 
grantee categories were confirmed using information from the Foundation Center and Internal 
Revenue Service. Two researchers (Kornhaber and Barkauskas) discussed each of the grants’ 
purposes and thereby developed a set of purpose codes. For example, we created codes for grants 
                                                          
1 This is a conservative listing of private foundations and grants. If we could not identify the purpose of a 
grant, then we did not include it. If we could not ascertain a foundation’s actual involvement, it was not 
included. For example, despite many hours examining online sources about the Broad Foundation and efforts 
to contact the foundation itself (which went unanswered), we were unable to determine with certainty what 
involvement the Broad Foundation had with the Common Core. Therefore, it is not included in our data. 
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given to non-school entities to develop or provide resources aligned to the Common Core, 
assistance to school districts or states for implementation, and advocacy for the reform itself. To 
supplement the private foundations’ brief descriptions about grantees and grant purposes, we drew 
on information about the grants from public reporting of the awards by states, districts, recipient 
organizations, and news media. We worked together over a period of three weeks and used these 
documents to assign purpose codes to each grant, to moderate discrepancies in coding, and 
ultimately to arrive at complete agreement on all coding for all grants.  
For the federal RTTT program, we examined applications from the 19 states that won 
RTTT awards (U.S. Department of Education, Programs, Race to the Top Fund, n.d.). Two of us 
(Kornhaber and Griffith) then reviewed the applications that responded to RTTT’s call for college-
and-career ready standards by adopting the Common Core. We began with the RTTT budget 
narratives, then read the main texts, and then appendices related to funding. Any amounts specified 
in these texts that were allocated to support the Common Core’s implementation were recorded 
alongside their purpose. These included funds to secure aligned resources from non-profit or for-
profit entities. States’ applications varied widely (e.g. they ranged in length from 100 to 653 pages, 
not including appendices) as did the degree of detail regarding planned expenditures. From the 
amounts specified in the budget narratives, main texts, and appendices, we estimated that the 
percentage of RTTT money that grantees planned to use for the Common Core ranged from 9% to 
37% with the majority of estimates clustering near the low end of this range. Ultimately, we allowed 
that 14% of the total RTTT funding from states that had adopted the Common Core might be used 
to support the Common Core’s implementation. This accorded with the 14% of the RTTT scores 
that could be awarded to applications that incorporated state adoption of common standards.2 Our 
estimates are similar to those in a study of 10 RTTT applications by Kolbe and Rice (2012). 
(3) For the analysis of the RTT-D applications, Kornhaber and Griffith initially used the 
same approach taken for the RTTT applications. RTT-D applications also varied widely in length 
and specificity about intended expenditures. However, our analysis of districts’ applications surfaced 
much greater variability, with our estimates ranging from 2% to 68% of RTT-D awardees’ budgets 
designated for implementing the Common Core. To explore this variation, we contacted all 21 RTT-
D grant recipients by both email and ordinary U.S. mail to request their estimates of the percentage 
of their RTT-D award that was being used to implement the Common Core. The responding six 
districts’ estimates ranged from zero (from a district within a state that had not adopted the 
Common Core) to 100%. The district superintendent who provided the latter estimate explained 
that “transformational systems work is needed to truly implement the Common Core.” Thus, there 
was no clear relationship between respondents’ estimates and the 19% of the RTT-D scoring system 
linked to preparing students for college and career. Ultimately, we relied on the estimates from our 
own document reviews, taking the midrange of the percentages to estimate that 33% of overall 
funding from RTT-D grantees that had adopted the Common Core was being used to support the 
reform’s implementation. 
(4) For IES, one researcher (Griffith) used a keyword search of the IES grants and contracts 
database to identify IES-funded projects on the Common Core. This search yielded 16 projects as of 
June 15, 2014. For each, the award amount, type of grantee (e.g., college/university, non-profit, for-
profit) and the purpose of the grant (e.g., research, development of aligned resources) were 
identified. This work was reviewed and confirmed by a second researcher (Kornhaber). 
                                                          
2 The RTTT scoring system specified that up to 70 of 500 points could be awarded for state applicants’ use of 
common standards, participation in developing high quality assessments, implementing such assessments, and 
transitioning to such standards and assessments (Department of Education, Race to the Top Technical 
Review, n.d. from http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/tier1-technical-review.pdf) 
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(5) For the two Common Core testing consortia, PARCC and Smarter Balanced, one 
investigator (Griffith) gathered budget figures from the RTTT Assessment Program award letters 
and final budget summary tables that each consortium received. These showed the amounts received 
by each consortia and purposes for which the funds were to be spent. This work was reviewed and 
confirmed by a second researcher (Kornhaber). Funds were allocated for purposes such as 
governance, assessment design and development, technology, and project management (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2013a; U.S. Department of Education, 2013b). These were publicly 
reported on the Department of Education’s website (U.S. Department of Education, Programs, 
Race to the Top Assessment Program, n.d).  
Limitations  
Our analyses focused on the funding sources for the Common Core, the purposes for which 
these funds were awarded, and the types of organizations (e.g., school districts, curriculum 
developers, testing entities) that received them. The amounts that travel from funders to recipients 
along each funding pathway are estimates. Because we sought to be conservative in crediting 
philanthropic and federal dollars for the Common Core, we may have underestimated amounts 
spent to advance the reform. 
In addition, some estimates are more certain than others, because grantors’ and grant 
recipients’ documentation varies greatly in specificity. For example, it is clear how much money has 
gone directly from the federal government to the two testing consortia to develop tests aligned to 
the Common Core standards. In contrast, despite substantial review of RTTT and RTT-D 
applications and triangulating sources of information about grant awards, it is less clear what 
percentage of the federal RTTT and RTT-D awards states and districts intended to allocate to the 
reform’s implementation. Nevertheless, as noted above, our estimated ranges and the overall 
percentage of RTTT budgets for the Common Core are similar to those obtained by Kolbe and Rice 
(2012) for “standards and assessments” in ten RTTT states. We have found no studies that 
estimated these percentages across RTT-D applications. Regarding philanthropic support for the 
Common Core, we believe our estimates of funding to direct recipients are reasonable, because we 
relied on multiple sources for the grants, and our estimates accord with findings about funding for 
research and for public schools from recent studies of venture philanthropy (see Greene, 2015; 
Reckhow, 2013; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014).  
Existing documentation allowed us to understand the kinds of entities that received direct 
and indirect (or downstream) funding in each pathway. In the text, we have illustrated these kinds of 
entities in different pathways with examples of individual recipients. We have also provided tables 
that list individual organizations that have received the greatest support from private foundations in 
terms of number of grants (Table 1) and dollars awarded (Table 2) and noted which of these have 
also received federal funding. However, existing documentation does not allow us to trace all the 
indirect recipients of Common Core funding. Both modest and more substantial amounts have been 
designated in RTTT and RTT-D budgets for unspecified indirect recipients.3 Research into each 
pathway would help shed light on downstream beneficiaries of Common Core funding from both 
                                                          
3 For example, Springdale Arkansas’ RTT-D budget provided $56,000 to equip the offices of eight Springdale 
teachers to provide professional development, but it did not specify the for-profit vendors of the teachers’ 
computers and office furniture (Springdale School District, 2013, p. 187). Maryland’s RTTT budget included 
$500,000 for an unspecified vendor of online modules to be used in conjunction with the results of Common 
Core formative assessments (Maryland Race to the Top Application, 2010, p. 461). 
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philanthropies and the federal government. It would also illuminate the extent to which funding may 
have pooled around particular downstream recipients. 
Findings 
We identified eight funding pathways along which philanthropic and federal money for the 
Common Core traveled to direct and downstream funding recipients. Below, we first describe the 
four pathways that initiated with philanthropic dollars and their purposes and then the four 
pathways that began with federal funding. 
Philanthropic Pathways of Funding for the Common Core 
Philanthropic dollars for the Common Core took four pathways. The pathways served 
different explicit purposes, indicated by their pathway names (see Figure 1). We estimated 
philanthropies provided $330 million through 309 grants awarded to varied types of organizations 
between 2008 and June 15, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Pathways of Common Core Funding from Philanthropies 
The dollar amounts of individual foundation grants ranged widely. The smallest was a 
$10,000 grant from the Gates Foundation to the Rodel Charitable Trust for a report on RTTT 
implementation in Tennessee and Delaware. The largest was $10.3 million awarded by the Gates 
Foundation to the New Venture Fund to support “implementation of the Common Core State 
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Standards and related assessments through comprehensive and targeted communications and 
advocacy in key states and the District of Columbia” (Gates Foundation, How We Work, n.d. [a]). 
The average grant was $1.07 million. We noted variations in entities funded, purposes, and amounts, 
and also the targeting of some organizations with repeated grants (Table 1) or particularly large 
grants (Table 2). 
 
Table 1 
Top Direct Recipients of Philanthropic Funding to Support Common Core: Recipients of Five or More Grants 
Recipient Grantor (# of grants) Amount Pathway 
Council of Chief State School 
Officers 
Grants Received: 13 
TOTAL: $35,130,042 
Gates Foundation (7) 
Carnegie Corporation (2) 
Hewlett Foundation (2) 
Helmsley (1) 
Lumina (1) 
$29,769,828 
$1,932,100 
$1,025,000 
$2,203,114 
$200,000 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
New Venture Fund 
Grants Received: 11 
TOTAL: $18,218,189 
Gates Foundation (5) 
Carnegie Corporation (1) 
Hewlett Foundation (2) 
Helmsley Charitable Trust (1) 
Lumina Foundation (2) 
$16,068,189 
$200,000 
$600,000 
$1,000,000 
$350,000 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors 
Grants Received: 10 
TOTAL: $12,855,043 
Gates Foundation (2) 
Lumina Foundation (3) 
Helmsley Charitable Trust (1) 
Hewlett Foundation (3) 
Carnegie Corporation (1) 
$7,118,652 
$1,369,000 
$502,391 
$3,365,000 
$500,000 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Council of the Great City Schools 
Grants Received: 6 
TOTAL: $8,125,942 
Gates Foundation (2) 
Gates Foundation (3) 
Hewlett Foundation (1) 
$4,455,494 
$3,170,448 
$500,000 
Indirect 
Strategic 
Indirect 
NGA Center for Best Practices 
Grants Received: 6 
TOTAL: $3,061,151 
Gates Foundation (3) 
Hewlett Foundation (2) 
Lumina Foundation (1) 
$2,386,151 
$450,000 
$225,000 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
The Aspen Institute 
Grants Received: 5 
TOTAL: $5,430,847 
Gates Foundation (3) 
Gates Foundation (1) 
Hewlett Foundation (1) 
$3,382,120 
$1,807,827 
$240,900 
Indirect 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Achieve 
Grants Received: 5 
TOTAL: $4,213,300 
Hewlett (1) 
Hewlett (2) 
Carnegie Corporation (1) 
Lumina Foundation (1) 
$300,000 
$1,500,000 
$2,163,300 
$250,000 
Indirect 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Thomas B. Fordham Institute 
Grants Received: 5 
TOTAL: $3,587,116 
Gates Foundation (4) 
Hewlett (1) 
$3,461,116 
$126,000 
Strategic 
Strategic 
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Table 2  
Top Direct Recipients of Philanthropic Funding to Support Common Core: Recipients of at least $5 million 
Recipient Grantor (# of grants) Amount Pathway 
Council of Chief State School Officers 
Grants Received: 13 
TOTAL: $35,130,042 
Gates Foundation (7) 
Carnegie Corporation (2) 
Hewlett Foundation (2) 
Helmsley (1) 
Lumina (1) 
$29,769,828 
$1,932,100 
$1,025,000 
$2,203,114 
$200,000 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
New Venture Fund 
Grants Received: 11 
TOTAL: $18,218,189 
Gates Foundation (5) 
Carnegie Corporation (1) 
Hewlett Foundation (2) 
Helmsley Charitable Trust (1) 
Lumina Foundation (2) 
$16,068,189 
$200,000 
$600,000 
$1,000,000 
$350,000 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors 
Grants Received: 10 
TOTAL: $12,855,043 
Gates Foundation (2) 
Lumina Foundation (3) 
Helmsley Charitable Trust (1) 
Hewlett Foundation (3) 
Carnegie Corporation (1) 
$7,118,652 
$1,369,000 
$502,391 
$3,365,000 
$500,000 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Strategic 
Colorado Legacy Foundation 
Grants Received: 3 
TOTAL: $11,455,547 
Gates Foundation (1) 
Gates Foundation (2) 
$4,853,605 
$6,601,942 
Indirect 
Strategic 
Kentucky Department of Education* 
Grants Received: 2 
TOTAL: $10,125,227 
Gates Foundation (2) $10,125,227 State 
James P. Hunt Institute 
Grants Received: 4 
TOTAL: $10,011,882 
Gates Foundation (2) 
Gates Foundation (2) 
$2,249,070 
$7,762,812 
Indirect 
Strategic 
Council of the Great City Schools 
Grants Received: 6 
TOTAL: $8,125,942 
Gates Foundation (2) 
Gates Foundation (3) 
Hewlett Foundation (1) 
$4,455,494 
$3,170,448 
$500,000 
Indirect 
Strategic 
Indirect 
Louisiana Department of Education* 
Grants Received: 1 
TOTAL: $7,351,708 
Gates Foundation (1) $7,351,708 State 
Charter Fund, Inc. 
Grants Received: 2 
TOTAL: $7,000,000 
Gates Foundation (1) 
Carnegie Corporation (1) 
$4,000,000 
$3,000,000 
Indirect 
Strategic 
National Center for Civic Innovation 
Grants Received: 1 
TOTAL: $5,718,700 
Carnegie Corporation (1) $5,718,700 Strategic 
Khan Academy 
Grants Received: 2 
TOTAL: $5,544,028 
Gates Foundation (2) $5,544,028 Indirect 
The Aspen Institute 
Grants Received: 5 
TOTAL: $5,430,847 
Gates Foundation (3) 
Gates Foundation (1) 
Hewlett Foundation (1) 
$3,382,120 
$1,807,827 
$240,900 
Indirect 
Strategic 
Strategic 
AFT Educational Foundation 
Grants Received: 2 
TOTAL: $5,400,000 
 
Gates Foundation (2) 
 
 
$5,400,000 
 
 
Indirect 
 
Note: *Also received federal funding via Race to the Top awards. 
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Below we describe the pathways that initiate with foundation funding, presenting them in 
order of the estimated amounts that philanthropies have awarded to them. We illustrate these 
pathways with individual examples of grants to show variation in recipients and grant size.  
 
Strategic Investment Pathway. The Strategic Investment Pathway was the largest route for 
philanthropic funding. Foundations awarded about $159 million along this pathway to 191 
organizations for the purpose of advancing the Common Core policy agenda.  
Recipients included management and consulting groups. For example, Rockefeller 
Philanthropy Advisors and the New Venture Fund, both non-profits, received some of the largest 
foundation grants. The latter received $10.3 million for communications to influence the context for 
the reform in key jurisdictions (Gates Foundation, How We Work, n.d. [a]). In addition, for-profit 
consulting groups, including McKinsey, the Boston Consulting Group, and Booz Allen Hamilton 
received Gates Foundation grants to help prepare states’ RTTT applications, which called in part for 
common standards, assessments and other supports aligned to the Common Core reform.  
There were also “astroturfing” grants that might cultivate grassroots support among diverse 
constituencies.4 For example, the Gates Foundation provided a $25,000 grant to the Hillsborough 
(Florida) PTA to “enhance its parent advocacy training modules for Common Core State Standards 
(CCSS)” (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, How We Work, n.d. [b]). It also gave $563,611 to the 
Military Child Education Coalition, “to support implementation of the Common Core State 
Standards by engaging military leaders and families” (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, How We 
Work, n.d. [c]). 
Strategic Investment Pathway grants were awarded as well to organizations of governmental 
policymakers. For example, private foundations gave multiple grants to the Council of Chief State 
School Officers (CCSSO), the largest grant recipient in both number of grants (Table 1) and dollars 
(Table 2) to help spur states’ adoption and implementation of the Common Core. The CCSSO and 
the National Governors Association (NGA), another recipient of multiple grants, served as official 
co-sponsors of the reform. Foundation grants were also awarded to the Education Commission of 
the States, the National Association of State Boards of Education, and the National Conference of 
State Legislatures.   
Business associations that received Strategic Investment Pathway grants include the 
Massachusetts Business Alliance for Education, the Florida Council of 100, and the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce Foundation. The latter was awarded $1.38 million from the Gates Foundation “to 
lead the effort to engage and educate state and local chambers to support Common Core State 
Standards” (The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, How We Work, n.d. [d]). Among professional 
associations, the State Educational Technology Directors Association received $150,000 from the 
Hewlett Foundation for “an enhanced and sustainable digital representation of the Common Core 
standards” (The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Grant Database, n.d.). 
Policy groups across a broad spectrum of political leanings were also funded, among them 
the Center for American Progress, the Aspen Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute. 
Foundations awarded grants to organizations focused on education policy and education reform. 
Achieve was among the largest recipients and received multiple grants for standards-alignment and 
project management work (see Table 1). Others include the Alliance for Excellent Education, the 
                                                          
4 “Astroturfing” refers to efforts to simulate the appearance of grassroots support. It was applied to strategies 
used to advance the Common Core by an interview participant in a separate research study conducted by 
Kornhaber, Griffith, and Tyler (2014). The term was derived from a response by the late Senator Lloyd M. 
Bentsen (D-TX) to piles of mail he received from opponents of proposed legislation: “Anyone in Texas can 
tell the difference between grassroots and Astro Turf” (Grant, 2004, p. 34). 
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Education Trust, and the Fordham Institute. These have lent support to the reform through 
convenings, publications, evaluation work, and advocacy. For example, the Fordham Institute 
received over $959,000 from the Gates Foundation “to review the common core standards and 
develop supportive materials” (The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, How We Work, n.d.[e]).  
 
Indirect Investment Pathway. The Indirect Investment Pathway encompassed the $115 
million that philanthropies awarded to for-profits and varied non-profits to create products or 
services for educators to use in implementing the Common Core. Some resources were to be 
provided without charge to districts, schools, or educators. Others were to be sold. 
Among for-profits, the Danielson Group received $2,962,620 in 2013 from the Leona M. 
and Harry B. Helmsley Trust to align its Framework for Teaching to the Common Core (Leona M. 
and Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust, Our Grants, n.d.). The aligned framework was to be sold to 
districts. Filament Games received $25,000 from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for 
“Drafting Board,” an online writing game aligned to the Common Core, which was to be distributed 
without charge (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, How We Work, n.d.[f]). 
The Indirect Investment Pathway also funded a heterogeneous group of nonprofits to 
support aligned professional development or curriculum. Among these were education reform 
groups (e.g., the Education Trust), policy organizations (e.g., Aspen Institute, Hunt Institute), 
entities that devise or deliver curriculum materials (e.g., Khan Academy, the National Writing 
Project), and professional associations. Among the latter was the National Council of Supervisors of 
Mathematics (NCSM), which received a $175,890 grant from the Noyce Foundation to “create and 
develop professional development sessions” for math education coaches and specialists (The Noyce 
Foundation, 2011). The sessions were offered without cost in-person, archived online, and used 
Inside Mathematics, an online resource for aligning math curriculum to the Common Core. The 
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD) received a $3 million grant from 
the Gates Foundation to develop Common Core tools and host conferences about the Common 
Core for teachers (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, How We Work, n.d.[g]). ASCD planned to 
provide some of these resources at no cost while others were to be sold. The American Federation 
of Teachers Education Foundation received $1 million from the Gates Foundation to support 
teacher development around the Common Core (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, How We 
Work, n.d.[h]). 
 
District Investment Pathway. In the District Investment Pathway, philanthropies 
disbursed $34.8 million to school districts to implement the Common Core. Districts then redirected 
some of that funding to non-profits and for-profits to acquire reform-related products or services. 
For example, the Gates Foundation gave $250,000 to Summit Public Schools, a charter operator in 
Redwood City, California, “to pursue cognitive assessments aligned to the Common Core” (Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, How We Work, n.d.[i]). Summit then had its Cognitive Skills Rubric 
aligned to the Common Core by the Stanford Center for Assessment, Learning, and Equity 
(Stanford Center for Assessment, Learning, and Equity, 2014).  
Some District Investment Pathway funds have been redirected downstream to for-profits. 
For example, Indiana’s Region 8 Education Service Center received $249,505 from the Gates 
Foundation to launch networks of teacher training to support the Common Core’s implementation 
(Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, How We Work, n.d.[j]). Region 8 then contracted with the 
Michael Burns consulting firm to evaluate networking needs and challenges (Region 8 Education 
Service Center, Gates Project Training Network Growing, n.d.). 
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Philanthropic dollars in the District Investment Pathway have been concentrated in a few 
districts. We estimate that more than half of the $34.8 million expended in this pathway has been 
given by the GE Foundation to seven school districts in which GE has long-term commitments.   
 
State Investment Pathway. In the State Investment Pathway, private foundations allocated 
$20.8 million to support states in their efforts to implement the Common Core. In turn, states 
redirected a portion of this money to for-profit vendors or non-profit entities. For example, in 2011 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation awarded $9.1 million to the Kentucky Department of 
Education to support the implementation of the Common Core standards, professional 
development, and teacher evaluation systems (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, How We Work, 
n.d. [k]). The Kentucky Department of Education in turn contracted with the Literacy Design 
Collaborative (LDC), a non-profit, and Reach Associates, a limited liability company, to support 
teachers’ use of the Common Core literacy standards (Kentucky Department of Education, Literacy 
Design Collaborative Teacher Institutes, Reach Associates and the Kentucky Department of 
Education, n.d.). 
In the State Investment Pathway, private foundations again concentrated their funding on a 
small group of recipients. Of the $20.8 million that traveled along the State Investment Pathway, 
Gates grants totaling some $10 million went to Kentucky. Louisiana received $7.3 million. 
Approximately $3.3 million was divided among Delaware, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.  
 
Federal Pathways of Funding for the Common Core 
Four additional pathways were funded with $1.12 billion from the federal government. The 
pathways have different purposes, as indicated by their pathway names, and they target different 
kinds of recipients (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 
2. 
Pathways of Common Core Funding from the Federal Government 
Below we present the four federal pathways in the order of the estimated dollar amounts 
awarded to them. We illustrate these pathways with examples to show variation in the types of 
recipient organizations and grant size.  
 
Race to the Top State Pathway. The Race to the Top State Pathway follows the $560 
million portion of the $4 billion in federal RTTT funding awarded to states to implement the 
Common Core. Federal awards to states ranged from $17 million (Illinois, Kentucky, and Louisiana) 
to $700 million (Florida and New York). States reallocated a portion of that federal funding to non-
profits and for-profits to obtain products and services for implementation. For example, New York 
State’s RTTT application allocated $26 million to for-profits, such as the Public Consulting Group, 
ConnectEDU, CaseNex, eScholar, and NCS Pearson/Schoolnet, to develop a data portal system to 
support students’ college and career readiness. New York also contracted with the non-profit New 
York State Technology Enterprise Corporation to provide independent monitoring of the portal 
system’s development (New York State Department of Education, 2013).  
 
Testing Consortia Pathway. The Testing Consortia Pathway consists of $361.7 million 
federal dollars awarded under the RTTT program to the non-profit testing consortia, PARCC, and 
the Smarter Balanced. The assessment consortia redirected large portions of this money to for-profit 
and non-profit entities.  
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Downstream for-profit recipients in the Testing Consortia Pathway include providers of test 
development and data management. For example, McGraw-Hill Education CTB, a company with 
expertise in psychometric test development, obtained a contract for $72.5 million from Smarter 
Balanced (Cavanaugh, 2014a). Both Smarter Balanced and PARCC awarded contracts totaling $20 
million for formative assessment, report development, and data management to Amplify Insight, 
then part of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. (Cavanaugh, 2014a; Smarter Balanced Assessment 
Consortia, 2013).  
Downstream non-profits in the Testing Consortium Pathway include AIR (formerly 
American Institutes for Research), which received a $20 million contract from Smarter Balanced for 
test-engine development, piloting, and test administration (Cavanaugh, 2014a; Smarter Balanced 
Assessment Consortia, n.d.). PARCC’s RTTT grant application allocated nearly $16 million for 
Achieve to provide project management (Partnership for Assessment of Readiness of College and 
Career, 2010). 
 
Race to the Top District Pathway. The Race to the Top District Pathway tracks funding 
used to advance the Common Core in school districts or district consortia that won RTT-D awards. 
Federal awards ranged from just under $10 million (KIPP, Washington D.C.) to $40 million (Green 
River Regional Education Cooperative, Bowling Green, Kentucky). Of the $520 million allocated by 
the federal government for RTT-D, we estimated $171 million was intended to implement the 
Common Core within school districts. In turn, districts intended to distribute portions of this 
funding to for-profits and non-profits to secure products and services for the reform’s 
implementation. For example, the Kentucky Valley Educational Cooperative (KVEC), an RTT-D 
grantee comprised of 17 districts, budgeted $2 million to buy aligned math and literacy curriculum 
from WIN Learning, a for-profit company. KVEC also budgeted $1.4 million to secure “evaluation 
and data analysis support and consulting related to continuous improvement” and faithful reform 
implementation from the non-profit RAND Corporation (Kentucky Valley Educational 
Cooperative, 2013, p. 204). 
 
Research and Development Pathway. Finally, the Research and Development Pathway 
entails $27.8 million in federal funding allocated by the Institute of Education Sciences to support 
the Common Core. Much of this was awarded to universities and other non-profits. Lesser amounts 
went to for-profit vendors. For example, Vanderbilt University received a $10 million IES grant to 
develop and evaluate interventions aligned with the Common Core to the improve reading and math 
achievement of students with disabilities. The non-profit SRI International received a grant of nearly 
$3.5 million to conduct a randomized trial of its Common Core aligned math curriculum and math 
achievement. The for-profit Imagine Education was awarded $900,000 by IES to develop a web-
based math game aligned to the Common Core. As Figure 3 below illustrates, the Research and 
Development Pathway provided a modest amount – about 2% of the overall allocations for the 
reform – to examine how the Common Core might function.  
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Figure 3. Percentage of Common Core Funding per Pathway 
 
Discussion 
Our findings illuminated eight funding pathways of funding for the Common Core reform, 
the pathways’ purposes, and types of funding recipients. In this section, we discuss clusters of 
funding pathways according to their purposes, and the flow of dollars into, through, and around 
public school systems. Through the lens of resource dependence theory, we note how these funding 
patterns reflect efforts by philanthropies and the federal government to reduce uncertainty for the 
reform from the wider political and social context or other organizations operating within it. We also 
discuss the implications of these funding patterns for the Common Core.  
Direct Funding for Alignment 
Two pathways, Indirect Investment and Testing Consortia, directly funded diverse types of 
organizations to align curriculum, instruction, professional development, and assessments to the 
Common Core standards. Such alignment is fundamental to the theory of systemic, standards-based 
reform (O’Day & Smith, 1993; Smith & O’Day, 1991).  
We estimate that 8% of funding for the reform has gone directly via the Indirect Investment 
Pathway to for-profit vendors and an array of non-profits, including universities, professional 
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associations, content specialists, and education reform and policy groups, to provide aligned 
curriculum, instruction, and professional development. Approximately 25% of all funding was 
directed to PARCC and Smarter Balanced via the Testing Consortia Pathway. The dollars to support 
aligned assessments versus aligned curriculum, instruction, and professional development 
underscore the centrality of the technical-rational nostrums (e.g., metrics, big data, measurable 
growth) valued by the philanthropic and federal champions of this reform. Investments in testing 
and accountability systems are also promising approaches to social control under RDT, since such 
systems are known to influence school and districts (e.g., Beardsley, Berliner, & Rideau, 2010; 
Booher-Jennings, 2005; Koretz, 2008; McNeil, Coppola, Radigan, & Vasquez-Heilig, 2008).  
 One consequence of the relative funding for aligned testing over aligned curriculum, 
instruction, and professional development may be that educators will lack necessary resources to 
implement the Common Core. In turn, this may fuel concerns that the Common Core is just 
another ‘test-driven’ reform (Burris, 2014) rather than an effort to create rich learning experiences. 
Complaints about the cart of testing being rolled out before the horse of instructional and 
curriculum supports have helped spark resistance to the testing that is integral to the Common Core 
reform. Despite substantial sums dedicated to marketing and public relations for the reform, such 
complaints have gained considerable media attention (Kornhaber, 2015; Strauss, 2015; Taylor & 
Rich, 2015). 
Direct Funding for States 
Two pathways, the philanthropic State Investment Pathway and the federal RTTT State 
Pathway, directly fund state departments of education, a necessary component of a reform policy its 
proponents describe as national (Kornhaber, Griffith, & Tyler, 2014; Rothman, 2011). We estimate 
that 40% of funding for the Common Core was awarded to 18 states and the District of Columbia. 
Almost all this funding came from the RTTT competition. In terms of RDT, these funding 
pathways speak primarily to the wielding of a critical resource, money, to influence states rendered 
resource dependent following the Great Recession of 2008-2009.  
One consequence of the federal government’s forward charge into common standards and 
common assessments has been a political backlash against federal overreach, particularly among 
political conservatives (Kurtz, 2013). In addition to its political consequences, funding of states’ 
education agencies was nevertheless inadequate on three counts. First, federal RTTT funding for 
state departments of education would be unlikely to enable ground-level improvements. State 
education departments rarely have the capacity to support improvements in teaching (Cohen & 
Moffitt, 2009). Moreover, RTTT may further constrain state agencies’ capacity to support the 
implementation of the Common Core by requiring them to coordinate with numerous new external 
entities that were also funded to advance the reform (Russell, Meredith, Childs, Stein, & Prine, 
2015). Finally, even if RTTT spurred unprecedented capacity-building at the state level, fewer than 
half the states were funded. Thus, the reform would be unlikely to spur college and career readiness 
across all states.  
Direct Funding for Districts 
We estimate that 14% of all funding for the reform was allocated directly to school districts. 
The District Investment Pathway awarded two percent of overall funding for the reform from 
private foundations to districts. The RTT-D District Pathway directed an additional 12% of all 
funding from the federal government to districts (see Figure 3). The RTT-D Pathway supported 66 
regular school districts within Common Core states and KIPP in Washington, D.C. These represent 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 24 No. 93 22 
 
less than 0.5% of the roughly 14,000 U.S. school districts. Philanthropies directly funded only 57 
public school districts and eight charter entities via the District Investment Pathway.5 Under RDT, 
these limited allocations indicate that influence over districts could be obtained through other 
investments. For example, the RTTT and Testing Consortia Pathways could broadly influence 
districts, by altering state policies to favor the Common Core standards and aligned tests.  
Our finding that few districts received philanthropic funds for the Common Core accords 
with recent research that shows foundation support for K-12 education is largely not expended on 
traditional public schools or districts (Reckhow, 2013; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014). However, one 
consequence of such funding may be that the vast majority of districts, in which the work of the 
Common Core’s universal college and career preparation must ultimately occur, will lack the 
resources and training needed to implement the reform. 
Direct Funding for Research 
The federal Research and Development Pathway provided $27.8 million in direct funding to 
the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) primarily for research. The Strategic Investment and 
Indirect Investment Pathways funded a handful of grants that included an applied research 
component to advance the reform or its implementation. For example, the Carnegie Corporation 
gave a $1.24 million grant to the Council of Chief State School Officers for “research and technical 
assistance which lays the foundation for the Common Core adoption process in states” (Carnegie 
Corporation of New, n.d.). 
Across all pathways, just over two percent of all funding for the Common Core has gone 
directly to support research. Much of it, like the $1.24 million grant from Carnegie noted above, was 
intended to further the Common Core, rather than investigate it. This stance, together with the small 
amount of funding in this pathway, supports Greene’s claim that contemporary reform advocates 
feel little need to examine their policy preferences (Greene, 2015). Under RDT, organizations’ 
efforts to influence other organizations and their social and policy contexts primarily entail the 
exercise of power (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), not inquiries into that exercise.  
One consequence for the reform of such limited research funding is that important 
questions about the Common Core may go largely unasked or unanswered. For example, how does 
this reform translate into better and more equitable learning for students across disparate schools 
and districts? 
Direct Funding to Advance the Common Core Policy Agenda 
The Strategic Investment Pathway’s direct recipients include a wide array of non-profits that 
advocate and provide logistical support for the reform (e.g., Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisers, New 
Venture Fund). The direct recipients also help scaffold the Common Core with a range of 
constituencies and convenings, which per RDT are efforts to market and legitimate the reform. 
Some 48% of philanthropic support – about 11% of all funding for the reform – has been expended 
for these direct recipients to carry the torch for the Common Core.  
One consequence of this weighting toward strategic investment has been to draw a good 
deal of attention to the funders’ role in promoting the Common Core (e.g., Dillon, 2009; Layton, 
2014; Ravitch, 2013; Schneider, 2015). Such attention, in turn, has raised questions about the claims 
                                                          
5  Some of the districts received both foundation support and RTT-D federal support. For example, the seven 
districts in the Puget Sound Educational Services District received funding from the Gates Foundation and 
an RTT-D award.  
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made by Common Core advocates that the reform is a state-led effort. Suspicions over the reform’s 
origins have spurred resistance to it (Ravitch, 2014a). 
Another possible consequence is that the commitment among some of the reform’s 
supporters may be shallow (Greene, 2015) and dry up once the philanthropy spigot is shut. 
Moreover, entities that are resource dependent, or heavily reliant on such funding, may need to be 
compliant. Such compliance may stifle potentially useful ideas that fall beyond the funders’ preferred 
technical-rational nostrums. Thereby, potential blind spots in the Common Core’s development and 
implementation may go unnoticed or unvoiced.  
Channeling Dollars Into, Through, Around and From School Districts 
While the pathways’ direct recipients vary, all eight pathways directly or indirectly channel 
dollars to entities beyond schools and districts. Approximately 86% of direct funding from 
philanthropies and the federal government to advance the Common Core was awarded to such 
entities. The 14% of direct funds for school districts targeted fewer than 1 in 200 of them. As a 
result, the vast majority of districts will have to expend part of their budgets to acquire aligned 
resources, computers, and related technology to implement the reform. Though estimates vary 
widely, collectively districts are expected to pay billions of dollars for Common Core resources 
(Murphy, Regenstein, & McNamara, 2012; Rebarber, 2012).  
It is possible to see this distribution of money into, through, around, and from school 
districts from the perspective of the reform’s leaders and allies. That is, such funding reflects an 
effort to support the resources needed for a systemic, standards-based reform that can prepare all 
students for college and career, achieve greater transparency, and yield economies of scale. Our 
analysis of pathways and clusters of pathways casts some doubt on this perspective. Aligned 
curriculum materials and professional development fundamental to teaching and learning within a 
new set of standards garnered 8% of total funding. In contrast, testing systems absorbed 25% of the 
overall funding. 
Given such allocations, it may be more justifiable to see the Common Core from the 
perspective of contemporary scholars who find that education policy is increasingly guided by 
technical-rational nostrums imported from venture capitalism and venture philanthropy, e.g.,  
metrics, big data, accountability systems, and competition (Barone & DeBray, 2011; Cuban, 2015; 
Greene, 2005, 2013; Hess, 2015; Mehta, 2013; Reckhow, 2014; Scott, 2009). This perspective is 
reasonably well supported, given that 39% of overall funding came from the federal RTTT 
competition, which prioritized not only common standards and assessments but also the 
development of data systems to track measurable growth, and 12% was allocated in the RTT-D 
District Pathway for a funding competition among districts. An additional 25% supported the 
testing consortia that would generate the data to track such growth.  
Resource dependence theory provides another useful lens through which to understand how 
funding was used to advance the Common Core. The federal government and private foundations’ 
financial support for the Common Core was a relative pittance: some $1.4 billion over six years, 
even as K-12 spending annually is over $605 billion. Yet, this proverbial ‘drop in the bucket’ has 
leveraged a great deal of activity on behalf of the reform (Greene, 2015) across the districts and 
schools in more than 40 states. By coordinating their efforts, the foundations and federal 
government reduced uncertainty over the reform’s adoption. This reduction was possible partly 
because social control processes are more effective when an organizational alliance includes an entity 
that has regulatory authority over an entire sector (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Additionally, RDT 
helps explain how this relative pittance influenced all but four states initially to adopt the reform. 
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Philanthropies and the federal government allocated a critical resource – additional money – during 
a severe recession that left state education systems vulnerable to social control processes.  
The federal RTTT and RTT-D funding for common standards and common tests can also 
be seen as efforts by the U.S. Department of Education to secure its own legitimacy. RTTT and 
RTT-D indicated the Department held values and beliefs that mirrored higher-status business and 
philanthropic entities. (See Mehta, 2013.) Thus, some 25% of overall funding was allocated in 
pursuit of test metrics and 39% and 12%, respectively for RTTT and RTT-D, were established as 
“competitions.”  
Grants in the Strategic Investment Pathway, estimated at 11% of overall funding, sometimes 
performed double duty. Alongside reducing uncertainty from interdependence, grants to 
organizations focused on education in disparate communities (e.g., the Military Child Education 
Coalition, the Council of Great City Schools) enabled public relations and marketing to those 
communities. Grants to policy groups across the political spectrum (e.g., Center for American 
Progress, American Enterprise Institute) served the analogous purpose of marketing the reform to 
divergent political camps. Notably the largest single philanthropic grant went to the New Venture 
Fund for communications and advocacy to key states about the reform. Such marketing is meant to 
enhance legitimacy from the wider social and political contexts and thereby support for the reform. 
Yet, despite federal and foundation funding that should have limited sources of uncertainty 
for the Common Core, dissent against the reform has risen since mid-2013 (see McDonnell & 
Weatherford, 2013). As flaws with the reform’s implementation surfaced, key stakeholders such as 
teachers unions, parents, and some state governors questioned the Common Core. Existing and new 
entities sought to delegitimize the reform and used the media to market and amplify their message 
(Harris, 2015; Ravitch, 2014b, Ujifusa, 2014; Ujifusa & Sawchuck, 2014).  
Opt Out, a movement advocating test refusal, was launched in August, 2011 (McDermott, 
2016). By spring 2015, some 675,000 students across the country were opting out of Common Core 
tests (FairTest, 2015). Their actions highlighted the dissatisfaction felt in thousands of local 
communities with policies, curriculum, assessments, and/or accountability systems that the federal 
government and philanthropies supported.  
Elected officials began to take note. Since 2014, the two testing consortia have lost most of 
their state participants. As of 2016, only 14 of the original 31 states in the Smarter Balanced 
consortium remain. Just six of the original 26 states remain in PARCC (Gewertz, 2016; Robelen, 
2010). It appears that $361.7 million in federal awards to the two testing consortia will not serve 
their intended purposes, i.e. forging a system of common high-quality assessments, fostering 
transparency across states, and enabling economies of scale. 
The most recent reauthorization of the ESEA, the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), 
reflects the failure of the federal government and foundations to sustain the social control processes 
that enabled the launch and implementation of the Common Core. ESSA prohibits the federal 
Department of Education from exercising authority or influence over states’ academic standards or 
tests. The Department of Education is also prohibited from mandating penalties against states when 
fewer than 95% of students participate in state accountability tests. The legislation furthermore 
allows states to provide parents with testing opt-outs for their students (Every Student Succeeds Act 
of 2015). Without mandates for common standards, aligned tests, and test participation central to 
the reform’s design, the Common Core will be hard-pressed to achieve its aims.   
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Conclusion 
We conclude by considering the benefits derived from Common Core funding. Money is 
beneficial insofar as it can be exchanged for something that is wanted. Here we assess how money to 
advance the Common Core has benefitted different types of grantors and grantees.  
Philanthropic foundations benefitted in several ways from their spending on the Common 
Core. They further rooted their preferences for competition and technical-rational nostrums, e.g., 
metrics, big data, measurable growth, and competition, in the education sector. They did so in part 
by funding entities essential to the reform’s operation, its supply of aligned resources, its support 
among constituencies in the wider social and political context, and its marketing. They did this even 
as the data that is supposed to drive venture philanthropy provided scant evidence that SBR 
improves achievement (e.g., Hamilton, Stecher, & Yuan, 2008; Loveless, 2012, 2016). Venture 
philanthropists’ broad and strategic funding enabled them to purchase increased influence over 
public policy and public institutions without incurring any accountability for the policies they 
advanced. It has also empowered them to install public policies without democratic processes 
(Cuban, 2015; Ravitch, 2014a; Scott, 2009). 
Spending to advance the Common Core also benefitted the federal government, at least to 
the point of ESSA’s enactment. The federal government wielded RTTT and RTT-D funding in a 
competitive manner, placing bets on potential winners in a manner akin to that of higher status 
venture philanthropies and businesses. We estimate that the combined funding along the RTTT and 
RTT-D Pathways totaled just over .12% of the $605 billion spent annually on public education. Yet, 
these competitions for critical resources during a deep recession enabled the federal government to 
exercise unprecedented influence over nearly every state’s standards.  
For-profit grantees that provided Common Core tests, aligned curriculum, or other 
resources benefitted through increased sales and revenue. A survey of vendors of educational 
software and digital content indicated that their market grew by 57% between the 2010-11 and 2012-
13 school years due to the Common Core and related demands for new assessments (Cavanaugh, 
2014b). This growth occurred even though it is not evident that such products improve teaching and 
learning or reduce achievement gaps.  
Non-profits that received direct or indirect funding to advance the Common Core benefitted 
by securing staff and other resources to sustain or grow their organizations. In some cases, the 
organizations continued doing work that was central to their aims. For example, Achieve received 
$4.2 million in direct funding from philanthropic foundations, and $16 million downstream in the 
Federal Testing Consortia Pathway. This money enabled Achieve to continue its long-term role in 
advocating for standards-based reform.  
However, in some cases, Common Core funding came partly at the expense of a non-profit’s 
mission or integrity. For example, the Aspen Institute received five grants totaling over $6 million. 
Aspen has an Education and Society Program to provide “an informed and neutral forum for 
education practitioners, researchers, and policy leaders to engage in focused dialogue regarding their 
efforts to improve student achievement….” (Aspen Institute, Overview of the Aspen Institute 
Policy Programs, n.d.). Yet, the Aspen Institute’s Education and Society website page was almost 
exclusively devoted to reports supporting the Common Core (Aspen Institute, Education and 
Society, n.d.). Similarly, the National PTA began advocating for the Common Core after receiving 
funding to do so from the Gates Foundation (Ravitch, 2014b). Yet, the National PTA’s mission is 
“to make every child’s potential a reality by engaging and empowering families and communities to 
advocate for all children” (National PTA, n.d.). The relationship of this mission to the Common 
Core is tenuous, since SBR does not typically raise achievement but often distorts teaching and 
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learning (e.g., Beardsley, Berliner, & Rideau, 2010; Booher-Jennings, 2005; Davidson, Reback, 
Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2013; Koretz, 2008; McNeil, Coppola, Radigan, & Vasquez-Heilig, 2008; Neal 
& Schanzenbach, 2007).   
School districts and schools may have benefitted by obtaining funding to secure resources to 
implement the Common Core. However, most districts were not directly funded, and collectively 
districts were expected to lay out billions to acquire aligned resources (Murphy, Regenstein, & 
McNamara, 2012; Rebarber, 2012). Moreover, implementation of SBRs has driven attention to 
metrics and measurable growth at the expense of attention to non-tested content or students’ social, 
emotional, and civic development (e.g., Koretz, 2008; Mehta, 2013). Given the performance of past 
standards-based reforms, the benefits of Common Core resources for school districts, schools, 
teachers, and students are, at best, uncertain. 
An analogy to the Gold Rush may be useful here: The claim stakers are the federal 
government and philanthropies that have staked out the Common Core for public policy. To work 
that stake, they incentivize states and school districts to mine the Common Core and get higher 
measured achievement. To do so, the miners need equipment. The vendors who sell the equipment 
profit in the short term, even if their tools rarely enable the miners to get the sought-after results. In 
essence, those who set directions for the Common Core and those who provided resources for its 
implementation have benefitted, even as potential benefits to schools, educators, and students are 
elusive, and the entire claim may ultimately be empty. 
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